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(1971 ), holding unconstitutional a preference for male executors of estates; Kirchberg 
v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981 ), invalidating the ability of a husband to unilaterally 
encumber community property when a wife lacks the same power. Compare Goes- 
~art v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1946), decided just two years before Shelley, and val- 
idating a Michigan preference for male bartenders. 
Richard H. Ch used, Background to Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co., adapted and revised from CASES, MATERIALS AND 
PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY 1156-1163, 1173-1174 (1988)* 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company was 
eagerly awaited by important federal government officials, Progressive Era reformers, real 
estate developers and local government officials across the country. It was widely viewed 
~s a crucial test of the validity of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act, adopted by 1925 in 
Just under half of the states and under consideration in many others. 
The adoption of zoning legislation was part of a much broader effort to reform 
national housing policies in the early twentieth century. Muckraking books such as Lin- 
coln Steffens' SHAME OF THE CITIES (1904) and Upton Sinclair's THE JUNGLE (1906) mirrored 
Widespread concern about the state of urban America. Tenement house regulations first 
appeared in New York City in 1901 and, along with building codes, spread gradually to 
~any urban areas by the 1920's. Shortly after Warren G. Harding assumed the Presidency 
in 1921, his Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, appointed an Advisory Committee on 
Zoning in the Department of Commerce. In 1924, the year following Harding's death and 
Calvin Coolidge's move to the White House, the Advisory Committee issued the Standard 
State Zoning Enabling Act and recommended its adoption by the states.1 By the end of the 
following year, nineteen states, including Ohio, had followed the Committee's advice. By the 
end of the decade, some or all localities in every state had been granted the power to zone. 2 
The Advisory Committee also reviewed the status of subdivision regulations in the 
various states. Some control of subdivisions had existed in many places well back into the 
nineteenth century. They were designed to assure that plat maps were correctly drawn and 
filed, and that engineering studies were appropriately completed. Other functions were 
gradually added, such as requiring that new streets tie into old ones and that utility lines 
be correctly laid. Shortly after Euclid was decided the Advisory Committee published a 
Standard City Planning Enabling Act, making subdivision regulation a tool of compre- 
hensive planning, placing administration of subdivision controls in the hands oflocal plan- 
ning boards, and establishing certain guarantees that improvements planned in 
subdivisions were actually carried out. The Standard Act, or some other similar regulatory 
* Copyright by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. Reprinted and adapted with permission of 
Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 
1 Virtually all persons favoring adoption of zoning argued that each municipality had sepa- 
rate and distinct problems and that actual implementation of zoning had to come at a local level. But 
lllost cities were then and are now legal creatures of state legislatures, limited in their authority to 
the powers granted in state legislation. It was therefore necessary for states to adopt legislation 
enabling city governments to adopt their own zoning schemes. 
2 National Commission on Urban Problems, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R. Doc. No. 34, 
9lst Cong., 1st Sess., 201 (1968). 
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scheme, was eventually adopted by most states. The two Standard Acts drafted by the 
Commerce Department are still the basic statutory structures used in many jurisdictions. 
The Village of Euclid actually adopted its first zoning ordinance in 1922, two years 
before the Commerce Department published its final draft of the Standard Zoning 
Enabling Act.3 Euclid followed in the footsteps of New York City which adopted its first 
zoning ordinance in 1916, two years after the New York state legislature adopted the 
nation's first zoning enabling statute.4 When Euclid adopted its zoning ordinance, the 
town's sixteen square miles of territory contained less than 4,000 people. It was mostly 
agricultural. While some land speculators, including Ambler Realty, had bought up parcels 
ofland in the town anticipating future industrial development, there were no factories in 
the Village of Euclid .. Indeed, during the decade before Euclid adopted its zoning plan, 
Ambler sold off some tracts east of the 68 acre site that became the subject of litigation in 
Euclid and imposed covenants prohibiting commercial and industrial development.5 
Aptly named Euclid Avenue was the major thoroughfare running through the town. 
Ambler's 68 acres sat between Euclid Avenue on the southeast and the Nickel Plate Rail- 
road tracks and the Cleveland city limits on the northwest. Under the first version of 
Euclid's plan, Ambler's land was zoned industrial (U-6) for a distance of 500 feet to the 
southeast of the railroad tracks and two family residential (U-2) over the rest of the site. 
Ambler's protests led Euclid to modify the plan so that a two family residential zone cov- 
ered the area 620 feet to the northwest of Euclid Avenue, apartment use (U-3) was per- 
mitted on the next 130 feet, and industrial use on the remainder. 
Despite the modifications creating a significantly larger industrial zone, Ambler filed 
suit seeking to enjoin enforcement of the zoning scheme. The Village sought to have the 
case dismissed, arguing that Ambler was required to pursue available administrative 
remedies to its claimed deprivation of property before seeking judicial relief. The motion 
to dismiss was denied by Judge David Westenhaver, who was appointed to the federal 
bench by President Wilson in 1917. Westenhaver was appointed in large part because of 
the influence of Ambler's attorney, Newton Baker. Baker served as Wilson's Secretary of 
War and was a close friend of Westenhaver's.6 A short time later, Westenhaver rendered 
his decision finding Euclid's ordinance unconstitutional.? 
Even though Westenhaver had close ties to Baker, it is virtually impossible to con- 
tend that his decision distorted prior Supreme Court jurisprudence in Ambler's favor. 
Within the two years before Westenhaver's January, 1924, opinion appeared, the Court 
decided three cases in a manner quite adverse to the notion that states had broad author- 
ity to regulate land or the economy. And in prior terms, the Court had made known its gen- 
eral hostility to property regulation in any number of opinions. 
In his opinion, Westenhaver noted that many of the older cases involved statutes 
designed to prevent activities commonly viewed as nuisances, such as livery stables and 
3 
Fluck, Euclid v. Ambler: A Retrospective, 52 J. AMER. PLANNING ASSOClATION 326, 328 
(1986). Fluck's article is a nice history of the case. See also, S. I., TOLL, ZONED AMERlCA 213-253 (1969). 
Euclid may have been ahead of the general trend because Alfred Bettman, who drafted the Standard 
Act for President Hoover, was from Ohio and deeply involved in development ofland use legislation in the state. 
4, 
The most prominent entity seeking adoption of zoning enabling legislation in New York was 
th.e ~ifth Avenue Commission established in 1913 by the Manhattan Borough President. The Com· 
mission was concerned about the growth of.tall buildings in'lower Manhattan and the negative effects 
of the garment industry. See TOLL, ZONED AMERICA 143-171 (1969). 
5 Fluck, supra, at 327-328. 
6 Id. 
7 
Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307 (N.D.Ohio 1924). 
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brick manufacturing plants, near residences. It was easy for him to view the sorts ofland 
Use restrictions imposed by Euclid's ordinance as quite different from the typical regula- 
tory fare that had previously come before the Supreme Court. Though there were certainly 
some examples that were hard for Westenhaver to deal with,8 most of the cases gave sig- 
nificant support for his general thesis that mediation of nuisance was not the primary 
objective of Euclid's zoning plan. 
He relied heavily, for example, on Buchanan u. Warley, decided in 1918.9 Westen- 
haver argued that if, as Buchanan held, racial zoning was invalid, then certainly Euclid's 
Plan had to fall. It was so obvious to Westenhaver that "colored" people and certain 
groups of immigrants were nuisances, that the Court's refusal to approve racial zoning 
removed all doubts about the invalidity of zoning for other purposes. Comparing the 
Buchanan and Euclid ordinances, he wrote: 
It seems to me that no candid mind can deny that more and 
stronger reasons exist, having a real and substantial relation to the 
public peace, supporting * * * [the Buchanan] ordinance than can be 
urged under any aspect of the police power to support the present ordi- 
nance as applied to plaintiff's property. And no gift of second sight is 
required to foresee that if this Kentucky statute had been sustained, its 
provisions would have spread from city to city throughout the length and 
breadth of the land. And it is equally apparent that the next step in the 
exercise of this police power would be to apply similar restrictions for the 
purpose of segregating in like manner various groups of newly arrived 
immigrants. The blighting of property values and the congesting of the 
population, whenever the colored or certain foreign races invade a resi- 
dential section, are so well known as to be within the judicial cognizance. 
Cases decided by the Supreme Court during the two terms before Euclid came 
before Westenhaver provided him with significant additional support. The most important 
of the cases was Pennsylvania Coal u. Mahon, 10 the 1922 decision finding that Pennsyl- 
vania's attempt to control subsidence of the surface from mining activities was a taking. 
'.['wo other cases appeared in 1923, Adkins u. Children's Hospital, 11 invalidating a Wash- 
ington, D.C., minimum wage statute, and Wolff Co. u. Industrial Court, 12 striking down a 
Kansas compulsory labor arbitration law. Westenhaver relied upon all three. The tenor of 
this segment of his opinions is revealed in the following excerpt: 
[C]onfusion of thought appears to exist touching the nature and 
extent of the police power.* * * * [C]ounsel [for Euclid] deduce* **that 
since the ordinance in question does not take away plaintiff's title or oust 
it from physical possession, the power of eminent domain has not been 
exercised, but that the police power has been. This conception recognizes 
no distinction between police power and sovereign power. The power 
asserted is not merely sovereign, but is power unshackled by any con- 
. 8 See, for example, Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 29 S.Ct. 567, 53 L.Ed. 923 (1909), which 
involved limitations on building height. Even recognizing that tall buildings and the light they block 
~ere a major concern of the New York legislature when they first adopted zoning statutes, Westen-· 
b a~er could say little more that the case involved "merely a reasonable regulation of the height of 
u1ldings." 297 F. at 315. 
9 
10 
11 
12 
245 U.S. 60 (1918). 
260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
262 U.S. 522 (1923). 
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stitutional limitation protecting life, liberty, and property from its 
despotic exercise. In defendant's view, the only difference between the 
police power and eminent domain is that the taking under the former 
may be done without compensation and under the latter a taking must 
be paid for. It seems to be the further view that whether one power or the 
other is exercised depends wholly on what the legislative department 
may see fit to recite on that subject. Such, however, is not the law. If 
police power meant what is claimed, all private property is now held sub- 
ject to temporary and passing phases of public opinion, dominant for a 
day, in legislative or municipal assemblies.13 
It was a major surprise when the Supreme Court reversed Judge Westenhaver and 
upheld Euclid's zoning ordinance. The reasons for this result have not become entirely 
clear, although suggestions have been made by those writing about the case. The Court 
may have been influenced by the recommendations emerging from successive, increasingly 
conservative, Republican administrations that zoning statutes be adopted. These endorse- 
ments ofland use controls reflected a widespread feeling that urbanization problems were 
getting a bit out of hand, that skyscraper technology threatened the fabric oflarge cities, 
and that middle and upper income single family residential areas needed protection from 
industrial developments and from immigrants, blacks and others living in high density 
apartments. 
A sense of the scope of change overtaking the United States may be gleaned by a 
quick glance at some demographic trends. The table below shows that the decade of the 
1920's was the first era when more than halfofthe population of the United States lived 
in urban areas and more than 10,000,000 cars were registered with local authorities. In 
addition, the major eastern cities were swamped with the millions of immigrants that had 
crowded these shores before World War I. If ever there was a propitious time for city plan- 
ners to have an impact on policies of urban America, the 1920's was that time. 
13 297 F. at 313-314. 
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DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS14 
Year Percent Auto Decade 
Population Urban Registrations Immigration Rate 
1830 9% - 2.4% 
1840 11% - 4.2% 
1850 15% - 12.4% 
1860 20% - 5.3% 
1870 26% - 8.1% 
1880 29% - 7.6% 
1890 35% - 7.3% 
1900 40% - 6.0% 
1910 46% 8,000 11.0% 
1920 51% 465,000 3.7% 
1930 56% 9,239,100 1.7% 
1970 73% 108,407 ,300 1.0% 
The Euclid Court was evidently troubled by these land use issues. After oral argu- 
ments were first heard during January of 1926, the case was set down for reargument that 
fall. Reargument is a rare event. Since the Court never states reasons why a case is set 
down for further discussion, historians may only speculate about why it happened in 
Euclid. Several intriguing facts are known about the case which may help explain the sit- 
uation. James Metzenbaum, Euclid's village counsel, requested and was granted the 
. right to file a reply brief after the oral arguments; the other side was granted the same 
right. The month after these briefs were filed, the court announced it had set the case for 
reargument.16 In addition, the National Conference on City Planning wished to file an ami- 
cus curiae brief in the case, but inadvertently missed the original filing deadline. Their 
counsel, Alfred Bettman, was a long time advocate of city planning, the draftsman of much 
. of Ohio's zoning legislation and secretary to the Advisory Committee on Housing and Zon- 
ing of the Commerce Department that drafted the Standard Zoning Enabling Act. He 
Wrote to Justice Taft 17 the month after the oral arguments in Euclid explaining the 
importance of the case to ci.ty planners and asking if he could file an amicus brief. Taft 
replied that he had brought the matter up in conference with the Court and invited 
14 Data is taken from Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, STATISTICAL HISTORY 
OF THE UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT at 8, 11-12, 105-106, 716 (1976). The 
immigration rate listed is the number of immigrants entering the United States as a percentage of 
total population for a ten year period beginning five years before the listed year and ending five years 
aJter the listed year. The number in the table is the sum of ten years of data, with each year repre- 
senting Total Immigration/Total Population for that year. 
16 Fluck, note 59 supra, at 331. 
17 Bettman was an old friend of Taft's and a fellow Cincinnatian. Id. 
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Bettman to submit the brief. Finally, a law clerk to Justice Harlan Fiske Stone at this time 
has claimed that Justice Sutherland, while writing an opinion striking down Euclid's zon- 
ing ordinance, was shaken in his convictions about the case after talks with those who 
would have dissented from his opinion.18 Justice Sutherland was also absent from the first 
oral arguments in Euclid, making it somewhat easier for him to justify rehearing the case. 
It may be of some importance that Justice Sutherland's three well known conservative col- 
leagues-Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds and Butler-dissented from Sutherland's 
majority opinion when the Euclid case was finally decided. Perhaps Sutherland and 
another justice switched sides. The dissenters' failure to publish an opinion may indicate 
they were unwilling to publicly squabble with their conservative colleague. In any case, 
Sutherland's authorship of the opinion has been declared a "jurisprudential miracle."19 
In hindsight, Justice Sutherland, like Judge Westenhaver, may also have been 
influenced by the enormous racial controversy of the World War I era. As Garret Power's 
essay on Baltimore's segregation ordinances, real estate agent cabals, and racial covenants 
suggests, devices to overcome Buchanan's limitations on apartheid rules were in wide- 
spread use during the first half of this century. Attempts to establish separate zones for 
single family houses and apartments was surely part of that process. At a minimum, it is 
fair to say that keeping tenement houses and other structures likely to be occupied by dis- 
favored people separate from middle and upper class residential areas was perfectly 
- compatible with racial segregation. Perhaps Sutherland, more than his conservative col- 
leagues on the Court, recognized that superficially neutral zoning ordinances could be used 
quietly for the very same purposes Buchanan banned from explicit use. 
NOTES 
1. Is Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), an embod- 
iment of Realist jurisprudence? 
2. What can the Takings Clause in the Constitution mean to a Realist? If prop- 
erty is once endorsed by the state and therefore given "realist" reality, may it be taken 
back later by the state only with payment of compensation? If so, are historic notions 
of wealth, once sanctioned by the state, forever frozen into our national charter? 
o. Property as Protecti~n. Fro"!' Large Enterprises and 
the Government: lndlvlduallsm and the Welfare State in 
the 1960's 
1. Liberty and Property in the Vietnam Era 
The Realist reconstruction of property as a set of relational rights between peo- 
ple endorsed by the state effectively merged the notion of property into a system of 
government organization. The significant increase in the scope of economic regula- 
tion accomplished by the New Deal, the dramatic regulatory apparatus accompany- 
ing World War II, and the systematic anti-Communist ordering of the McCarthy era 
created great _concern about the status of individuals or unprotected groups in the 
developing welfare state. The civil rights movement, a new wave of feminist activity, 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 333. 
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Welfare recipient organizations, tenant groups and anti-Vietnam War actions all 
brought the status of individuals to public notice in passionate ways. 
Charles Reich's article on The New Property hit the legal world like a bombshell. 
Reich's argument that both accretion and loss of wealth were so dominated by 
state-controlled systems of largess that individual liberty was threatened turned 
lights on for a generation of lawyers. For conservatives it was a clarion call to 
rethink the underpinnings of the welfare state; for liberals it provided justifications for 
controls over the more arbitrary features of the modern state, For all it produced a 
Vibrant dialogue about the meaning of property. 
Thinking of property, as Reich did, as a barrier between the individual and the 
corporate state is quite different than the early Republican use of property ownership 
to define civic responsibility. Rather than setting a norm for merger of public and pri- 
vate functions, property for Reich established a boundary between public power and 
private needs. As a result, process became a major focus of attention. Bringing dis- 
putes into the public eye, providing a forum for evaluation of arbitrary actions, and 
establishing settings for individuals to openly dispute the legality of actions by gov- 
ernment or other large organizations in society was an important method for giving 
property-like powers to those receiving government largess. Even the Supreme 
Court paid heed, holding in Goldberg v. Kelly, 357 U.S. 254 (1970), that welfare ben- 
efits could not be terminated without a hearing. Though the scope of procedural rights 
that attach to government largess has diminished with the decisions of later Supreme 
Courts, Reich's thesis had an important, and perhaps ongoing, moment in the sun. 
For his own retrospective views on The New Property, see Charles A. Reich, Beyond 
the New Property: An Ecological View of Due Process, 56 BROOKLYN L .. REV. 731 
(1990). 
The same basic reasoning structure produced a second famous article, by 
Christopher Stone, claiming that inanimate objects in the environment ought be 
deemed holders of property rights subject to protection in American courts. If prop- 
erty is a right of exclusion endorsed by the state, then why not remove ttie require- 
ment of a human relationship from the definition of property and permit protection of 
the ecology so that both human and ecological relationships may flourish? 
But the articles of Reich and Stone, like those of the Realists before them, ulti- 
mately contained no clear guidance for defining property. To argue that property is 
both the creature of government, and the safeguard of individual liberty and envi- 
ronmental well being is to place liberty and well being constantly at risk. It in fact con- 
flates public and private realms even as it proclaims the need for their separation. 
The rest of this anthology contains a variety of materials selected to allow you 
to attempt your own reconstruction of the idea of property as a meaningful cultural 
category. Basic legal commentary is mixed with a variety of works using non-legal dis- 
ciplines to structure analysis. 
